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La ‘guerra contra el terrorismo’, lanzada por el gobierno de los Estados Unidos y sus aliados luego de los ataques del 11 de septiembre de 2001 en Nueva York y Washington, transformó profundamente el entorno geopolítico de la última década. En particular, la preponderancia de los enfoques de línea dura en materia de seguridad respecto de los conflictos inter- e intra-estatales han llevado a que todas las formas de insurgencia armada en contra del orden sociopolítico establecido se interpreten, de manera general, a través del lente del ‘terrorismo’, sin tener en cuenta la naturaleza de esos actores, su grado de legitimidad social o sus roles y aspiraciones políticas. Esas tendencias han afectado severamente las dinámicas de los conflictos armados, así como el desarrollo de los procesos de paz y los entornos de posguerra. De hecho existe una tendencia creciente a considerar a todos los actores armados como ‘corruptores de la paz’ a quienes hay que combatir a toda costa, o al menos pacificar mediante el desarme, la desmovilización y la reintegración (DDR), en lugar de verlos como agentes de cambio que pueden desempeñar papeles constructivos en el logro de la paz y la construcción de estados más legítimos.

• Year 2012
• Author(s) Véronique Dudouet, Hans-Joachim Giessmann, Katrin Planta

La ‘guerre contre la terreur’, lancée par le gouvernement des Etats Unis (EU) et ses alliés à la suite des attaques du 11 septembre 2001 à New York et à Washington, a profondément transformé l’environnement géopolitique de la dernière décennie. La dominance des approches militaires et policières face aux conflits inter- et intra-étatiques a conduit à une interprétation généralisée de toutes les formes d’insurrections armées défiant l’ordre socio-politique établi à travers le spectre du ‘terrorisme’, et ce, indépendamment de la nature de tels acteurs, de leur degré de légitimité sociale et de leurs rôles et aspirations politiques. De telles tendances ont considérablement affecté non seulement les dynamiques des conflits armés, mais aussi le déroulement des processus de paix et les environnements d’après-guerre. Il est de plus en plus courant de considérer tous les acteurs armés comme des ‘saboteurs’ à combattre à tout prix ou, au mieux, à pacifier par le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration (DDR), plutôt que comme des agents du changement capables de jouer un rôle constructif dans la stabilisation de la paix et la construction d’Etats plus légitimes.

• Year 2012
• Author(s) Véronique Dudouet, Hans-Joachim Giessmann, Katrin Planta

The article argues that the demand for local ownership in externally funded conflict transformation projects is counterproductive, if it is seen as a concrete project objective. Nevertheless, the demand has an important function as policy ideal, pointing to the necessity for change in present international cooperation. Instead of aiming towards the impossible goal of literal “local ownership” of a foreign-funded project, which by definition inscribes the roles of donor and beneficiary, the focus should be on the nature of the relationship between the donors and the beneficiaries. It is within this relationship that power is or is not shared and that the equality of the partners may or may not be realised. The concept of "learning sites" can be used as a framework to counter asymmetrical relationships and develop a more equal partnership between “insiders” and “outsiders” in international peacebuilding work.

• Year 2006
• Author(s) Hannah Reich

The case of Colombia is especially interesting as regards the transition of liberation or resistance movements from armed struggle to legal, political entities. Not only has it one of the longest guerrilla conflicts in the world (more than 40 years to date); it is also a place where experiments in peace-making with armed insurgents have been explored for more than 25 years. Various peace processes led to different peace agreements in the 1990s which made it possible for ca. 5,000 guerrillas to demobilise and reintegrate into social and political life. Although this did not signify the end of the armed conflict in the country, it entailed a series of political transformations which changed the context in which the nation developed and made a definitive solution to the conflict possible.

• Year 2008
• Author(s) Mauricio García Durán, Vera Grabe Loewenherz, Otty Patiño Hormaza

The decision to establish the military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK-Spear of the Nation, also known as Umkhonto), was a somewhat complex process. It was a decision that involved a major departure in the policy and practice of the organisation. Many of the leaders of the ANC and its allied organisations questioned whether they had really exhausted the limits of non-violent action. Above all, it was a decision taken in conditions where the organisations were prohibited from operating peacefully.

• Year 2008
• Author(s) Mac Maharaj

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched an armed insurrection movement, the People’s War, on February 13, 1996. Six years earlier, this Himalayan kingdom had experienced a major political change. In April 1990, after nearly thirty years of direct rule by an autocratic monarchy, the Nepali people re-established multi-party democracy with a constitutional monarchy through a street movement lasting 50 days. On the left, the political landscape was divided into various communist factions, which went through a major phase of restructuring, leading to the formation of the CPN (United Marxist-Leninist), the biggest communist party in Nepal, as well as the CPN (Unity Center) and the United People’s Front Nepal (UPFN), both of which were formed by more radical groups. In the first general election held after 1990, the Nepali Congress (NC) party gained a majority in the House of Representatives and formed a government, while the CPN (UML) and UPFN became the second and third largest parties. Following several years of intra-party debates, two radical factions of the CPN (Unity Center) and its open political front, the UPFN, led respectively by Prachanda and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, formally changed their party name to the CPN (M) in March 1995, with the primary objective of launching an armed rebellion: the People’s War.

• Year 2008
• Author(s) Kiyoko Ogury

The conflict in Sri Lanka is one of the world’s most protracted and multi-faceted. It has been aptly described as a conflict “where economic, political and cultural deprivation and grievances of a minority have provoked a violent rebellion against a state that has come to be seen as representative of only the majority ethnic group” (Orjuela 2003:198). Since long-simmering tensions between the island’s Tamil community and the Sinhala-dominated state erupted into open confrontation between several militant groups and the Sri Lankan armed forces in the early 1980s, the conflict has grown in intensity and complexity. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which emerged as the dominant Tamil protagonist following a number of early confrontations within the broader Tamil resistance movement, has since developed both a conventional military force and a substantial civil administrative apparatus in the parts of the island it has established control over. Since the conflict began, there have been five formal attempts to resolve it through negotiations. All, including the Norwegian-facilitated peace process which began in 2002, have proved abortive, with the fighting resuming with greater ferocity each time.

• Year 2008
• Author(s) Suthaharan Nadarajah, Luxshi Vimalarajah

The Acehnese and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Acheh Merdeka, GAM) have always described the nature of their rebellion against the Indonesian state as ‘politics, not guns’. According to the GAM leadership, they decided to take up arms because it was the only language that was available to them in order to make the central government in Jakarta understand the situation in Aceh, an Indonesian province located at the northern tip of Sumatra Island. It was a political action to counterbalance the language of the enemy. The GAM leadership, both in Aceh and in exile, has maintained that the conflict was never about violence per se, but rather a political conflict that required a political solution. Consequently whenever the other party to the conflict, the Indonesian central government, has shown the political will to negotiate a political solution, GAM has always responded positively.

• Year 2008
• Author(s) Agus Wandi, Wolfram Zunzer

The history of resistance to English/British interference in Ireland over eight centuries has gone through many different phases: passive resistance, agrarian unrest, armed uprising, setbacks, defeats and regroupings, temporary victories, mass movements and political agitation, language and cultural struggles, democratic gains, and constitutional and parliamentary engagement. The last is often the most challenging phase to any revolutionary movement.

• Year 2008
• Author(s) Bairbre de Brún

The objective of the present study is to analyse the evolution of the conflict between the Spanish state and the Basque Country, from the creation of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA - Basque Country and Freedom) in 1958 to the present, from the point of view of the pro-independence forces. We will start with a quick overview of the origins of the conflict, before presenting the formation and development of the so-called “abertzale left” (Ezker Abertzalea) – which could be translated, and will be at times referred to here, as the patriotic left, nationalist left or pro-independence left. We will also look at the various phases of the search for a solution to the conflict through dialogue and negotiation. Although we will mention the relationship between the northern territories of the Basque Country and France as part of the historical analysis, we will not be studying the development of the nationalist and identity movement in the north. Instead, we will focus here on the conflict between the Spanish state and the Basque Country.

• Year 2010
• Author(s) Urko Aiartza Azurtza, Julen Julen Zabalo