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The recent conflict in Kosovo is often referred to as a unique case study for several reasons: the factors that contributed to the sudden rise of the Albanians’ armed insurgency movement in the mid- to late-1990s; the heavy involvement of the international community, climaxing in the armed intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) against a sovereign state – Serbia/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); and the subsequent establishment of the international protectorate in Kosovo, led by the United Nations (UN) in concert with the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the widest array of international organisations to date. These unique circumstances, so the argument goes, have followed Kosovo’s political path, leading up to its declaration of independence. Along this path, international norms of self-determination and human rights versus those of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters have been invoked, tested and have even clashed repeatedly. The recent deliberations at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague as to whether or not Kosovo’s declaration of independence is legal bear testimony to this clash.

• Year 2010
• Author(s) Armend R. Bekaj

In the context of an authoritarian regime, controlled by the military in alliance with a powerful landowning oligarchy, Salvadoran political-military organisations sprung up throughout the 1970s. Political and economic exclusion were the basis from which a wide popular movement arose – one that was to be almost immediately confronted with massive and indiscriminate repression. Faced with the closing of arenas for political participation, huge numbers of activists joined the ranks of the guerrilla army during the late 1970s. The five Salvadoran revolutionary organisations1 created the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN) in October 1980, with the joint aim of both procuring the government’s defeat as well as creating a socialist project.

• Year 2010
• Author(s) Alberto Martín Álvarez

The civil war sparked by the assassination of President-elect Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993 pitted a variety of mostly Hutu rebel movements – principally the National Council for the Defence of Democracy and the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (identified by its French acronym, CNDD-FDD) – against Burundi’s regular army. The principal demands of the rebel groups were the return to constitutional law, the institution of democratic majority rule and, most especially, the reform of the Tutsi-dominated army that was viewed as the centre of power. The peace negotiations initiated in June 1998 in Arusha (Tanzania) led in August 2000 to a peace and reconciliation agreement without a ceasefire – mainly because of internal dissent within the main rebel groups and the virtual exclusion of the real belligerents from the negotiation table. Eventually, the ceasefire agreement signed in November 2003 between the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza and the Transitional Government led by President Domitien Ndayizeye enabled peace to return to most of the territory – with the exception of the zones where the remaining rebel group, the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People and National Forces of Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL), which was hostile to any peace agreement with the government, continued to operate.

• Year 2012
• Author(s) Willy Peter Nindorera

La guerre civile déclenchée en octobre 1993 par l’assassinat du président élu Melchior Ndadaye a opposé essentiellement divers mouvements rebelles majoritairement hutu, dont principalement le Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie et Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), et l’armée régulière. Ces groupes rebelles avaient pour principales revendications le retour de la légalité constitutionnelle issue des élections de 1993, la mise en place d’une démocratie majoritaire, et surtout la réforme d’une armée dominée par les Tutsi et considérée comme le cœur du pouvoir. Les négociations de paix initiées en juin 1998 à Arusha en Tanzanie débouchèrent sur un accord pour la paix et de la réconciliation en août 2000 en l’absence de cessez-le-feu, du fait notamment de dissidences internes au sein des principales rébellions et de l’exclusion de fait des véritables belligérants. Ce n’est qu’à la faveur de la signature d’un accord de cessez-le-feu en novembre 2003 entre le CNDD-FDD de Pierre Nkurunziza et le gouvernement de transition dirigé par le président Domitien Ndayizeye qu’on a pu observer un retour de la paix sur la majeure partie du territoire, en dehors des zones d’opération de la rébellion du Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu et Forces Nationales de Libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) réfractaire à tout accord de paix avec le gouvernement.

• Year 2012
• Author(s) Willy Peter Nindorera

The unresolved ‘Kurdish question’ is closely tied to the interests of global powers, and as such is as much the problem of England, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) as of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the region. In short, the Kurdish question is an international problem.

Because Kurds have always lived under the sway of others, they have had difficulty establishing the internal dynamics and motivation required for self-administration. The result has been a lack of societal unity and religious ideologies that sometimes conflict with one another – which explains the Kurdish people’s vicious cycle of dividedness, external reliance, inner conflict and subdivision into even smaller pieces.

• Year 2014
• Author(s) Adem Uzun

This brief examines the impact of the second Constituent Assembly elections on Nepal’s peace and conflict context. Considered narrowly through a democratisation lens the elections can be hailed a success. However, if one unpacks the larger processes surrounding the event a more nuanced picture emerges. This brief argues that Nepal’s peace process has moved from simplicity to complexity; a reality that is reflected in, but not accommodated by, the electoral process. The brief presents a range of options to address this discrepancy.

• Year 2014
• Author(s) Marike Blunck

The 2019 edition of the Berghof Glossary revisits the main principles and approaches that we use in our work to support people and conflict parties around the world. For a second time, our team has embarked on a joint exploration in order to chart a shared understanding of what it takes to create “space(s) for conflict transformation”.

• Year 2019

This book compiles conceptual and empirical insights on the decision-making process, rationale and determining factors which underlie the strategic shifts undertaken by armed movements towards nonviolent struggle for self-determination or regime change.

Bringing together academics from various disciplinary traditions the book offers a wide range of case studies – including South Africa, Palestine and Egypt – through which to view the changes from violence to nonviolence within self-determination, revolutionary or pro-democracy struggles.

• Year 2015

• Year 2014
• Author(s) Janel B. Galvanek

Develops a basic concept of internationally oriented, context-related and process-oriented peace education with clearly defined target groups. Against this background, the author presents a comprehensive and practical approach to peace education in crisis and conflict regions, the aim being to promote conflict transformation. In this context, a fundamental distinction is made between direct peace education (encounter, inspiration, training) and structural peace education (pilot projects, curricula, implementation). The context-related interaction between these two basic forms is identified as a promising approach and offered up for discussion. Brief case studies from the practice of peace education are presented for the purpose of illustration.

• Year 2014
• Author(s) Uli Jäger