Berghof Foundation

GETTING THE TIMING RIGHT

Sequencing DDR and Political Transformation Support

A Primer

About this Primer

This Primer offers guidance to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) practitioners, peacebuilding actors, and international partners on options for sequencing DDR and political transformation processes for better alignment, and ideally mutual reinforcement. Drawing on lessons from contexts such as Nepal, Liberia, Northern Ireland, the Philippines and Colombia, it explores how sequencing decisions shape the balance between security and political inclusion during post-conflict transitions. The Primer offers conceptual framing, comparative examples, and a set of practitioner-oriented principles to support more coherent, context-specific approaches.

Rather than prescribing a single model, it aims to help practitioners to recognise sequencing as a dynamic process of negotiation and trust-building, one that must be grounded in local and national realities, adaptable to changing conditions, and mindful of the equilibrium between coercive and participatory forms of power. By identifying linkages, coordination mechanisms, and options for sequencing across DDR phases, the Primer contributes to ongoing efforts to design peace processes that are both politically inclusive and operationally feasible.

Design & Illustration: AMBERPRESS, Katja Koeberlin, Gosia Warrink

Published by

Berghof Foundation

UN

Supported by

Federal Foreign Office

© 2025. All rights reserved.



Introduction

The political transformation of armed actors is an essential yet often underexplored dimension of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). While DDR has traditionally prioritised the technical and security aspects of restoring the state's monopoly of force, durable peace depends equally on enabling former combatants to participate meaningfully in political life. Without credible political pathways, disarmament risks being perceived as coercive, and reintegration may fail to address the root causes of conflict, especially those linked to exclusion, representation, and legitimacy. Understanding DDR and political transformation as interconnected processes allows practitioners to see peacebuilding not merely as a shift from war to stabilisation, but as a negotiated rebalancing of power from coercion to participation.

Definition: Political transformation

We define the political transformation of armed groups as the process through which former combatants gain opportunities and capacities to participate meaningfully in governance and political decision-making. The steps involved can vary greatly across contexts but often include the formation of a new political party or other organisational transformation, and the establishment of legal provisions and security guarantees to support the transition to civilian and political life, including participation in elections. In some cases, political transformation also involves participation in transitional governance or power-sharing arrangements. Alternately, it can translate into informal pathways to non-violent politics through civic engagement and social movement activism.

These activities must be supported by adequate societal, legal and institutional conditions, ideally agreed between the conflict parties during peace negotiations and further developed thereafter. Organisational transformation or party formation should be accompanied by the necessary legal framework – such as de-listing from terrorist designations and electoral or parliamentary reforms. Political and civic education must be properly resourced, and security guarantees established to enable former combatants to engage safely and effectively in political life.

WHAT?
Understanding the link between DDR and political transformation

The relationship between DDR and political transformation marks a negotiated shift in how power is exercised and legitimised after conflict. For non-state armed groups, DDR means giving up a core source of leverage — the organised use of force. To make this acceptable, disarmament must be matched by credible opportunities for political participation or by other assurances addressing their political grievances. Linking DDR and political transformation therefore requires balancing the reduction of military capability with an expansion of political space.

From the state's perspective, restoring the monopoly of legitimate force also implies opening inclusive political avenues for former armed actors to pursue their goals peacefully. The state itself, particularly in contexts of leadership change, may also undergo a parallel political transformation that shapes the broader environment for DDR. Importantly, both sides must move in step, maintaining a trust-based equilibrium: if DDR advances faster than political inclusion, ex-combatants may feel coerced or marginalised; if political inclusion comes without credible disarmament, the state may see it as a threat. Sustainable peace depends on calibrating these processes so that the surrender of arms and the acquisition of political voice reinforce one another.

In essence, DDR and political transformation together move the balance of power from coercion to participation, turning armed actors into legitimate political stakeholders within a redefined political order.[1]

What this means for practitioners

DDR processes engage, through their various programmes and tools, with the full lifecycle of armed actors. At their core, DDR efforts also seek to address the underlying drivers that lead individuals to join armed groups, including the political, social, and economic grievances that fuel armed group mobilisation. As noted above, many of these drivers are inherently political. In this context, engaging on the political transformation of armed actors can serve as a complementary tool that supports this broader process, similar to community violence reduction (CVR) that aims to address community-based socio-economic dynamics. Viewed through this lens, political transformation can strengthen, complement, and reinforce DDR processes, and can also support individual pathways out of violence in contexts where a full DDR programme is not feasible.

Recognising DDR and political transformation as two sides of a negotiated power shift has practical implications for programme design, coordination, and sequencing. Peace negotiators and DDR planners must look beyond technicalities of managing weapons collection or cantonment schemes to consider how disarmament affects the political bargaining position of ex-combatants and their leadership. Each phase of DDR alters the comparative leverage of the state and the former armed group. Practitioners therefore need to ensure that as armed capacity decreases, credible political pathways expand in parallel: through representation mechanisms, transitional governance arrangements, party formation, or civic participation initiatives. On the state side, DDR support should be synchronised with confidence-building measures and inclusive reforms that signal acceptance of the former movement as a legitimate political actor. This equilibrium-building approach helps prevent perceptions of one-sided disempowerment, maintains trust in the peace process, and links security transitions to tangible political gains, the true hallmark of sustainable DDR implementation.

Practically, the design and sequencing of political transformation activities will vary depending on the stage of the power shift. Some activities – such as civic education – may be appropriate during demobilisation, when other political avenues are not yet defined. Other activities, such as supporting

1 This reasoning assumes the presence of a democratic political system capable of absorbing new political competitors, as well as the existence of underlying political claims by non-state actors that cannot be substituted or satisfied through economic incentives alone.

the formation of a new political party, may not be feasible or appropriate until broader negotiations with the government are underway or a genuine post-conflict phase has begun. Activities linked to informal social movements or non-violent political activism may be possible while conflict is ongoing, but they may also attract scrutiny or resistance from those in positions of state authority.

At the same time, sequencing should not be over-engineered or designed as an overly rigid blueprint. In practice, peace processes unfold in unpredictable ways, and excessive technical complexity can paralyse implementation or erode ownership by national actors. Instead of aiming for perfect sequencing logic, practitioners should focus on maintaining flexibility, communication, and trust between the parties. A workable, adaptive process – anchored in local realities and political pragmatism – is often more effective than a perfectly designed plan that cannot be executed.

The ecosystem of peacebuilding pillars

Beyond identifying linkages of political transformation and DDR efforts, it is essential to consider the positioning of these within the broader ecosystem of peacebuilding sectors that take place in a post-war environment. Table 1 provides an overview of other peacebuilding pillars that interact with DDR and political transformation, as well as entry points for coordination across these sectors.

Table 1: Linkages and interactions of DDR and political transformation with other peacebuilding pillars

Peacebuilding pillar	Link to DDR	Link to political transformation	Key coordination needs
Security Sector Reform	Integrating ex-combatants to security institutions; building professional forces.	Civilian control, security governance.	Shared planning, eligibility criteria.
Constitution-building/reform	Constitutional guarantees (e.g., decentralisation, representation, federal arrangements) can serve as political incentives for disarmament.	Participation of ex-combatants in constitution-drafting processes consolidates their transformation from insurgents to stakeholders.	Inclusive dialogue fora such as national dialogues.
Transitional Justice	Amnesty provisions or vetting mechanisms (such as screening) often determine eligibility for DDR benefits, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration pathways, and political participation.	Accountability and legitimacy of new political entities or individuals.	Balancing justice needs, political inclusion and DDR benefits.
Socio-economic recovery	Building individual livelihoods and cooperative support structures.	Access to public financing for political parties and other public funds; political transformation requires credible peace dividends and social inclusion policies that demonstrate the benefits of peaceful participation.	Assessing political economy of conflict and income sources of armed actors to identify alternatives.
Elections	Timing affects the legalisation and organisational transformation: holding elections too soon may favour militarised parties or exclude reintegrating ex-combatants; delaying them too long can stall the legitimacy of the transition.	Political legitimacy; Political and civic education programmes can prepare ex-combatants for peaceful campaigning and political competition.	Timing of party registration and elections.

WHEN?
Sequencing Options and Pathways:
Four scenarios

The right timing and sequencing between DDR and political transformation varies across contexts. It is shaped by factors such as the balance of power between conflict parties, the level of trust achieved during negotiations, and the institutional and financial capacity to implement both processes. To make sequencing choices more tangible, it is useful to think in terms of sequencing scenarios: distinct but overlapping models that illustrate the different ways DDR and political transformation can be aligned. These scenarios are not rigid templates but analytical tools: they help practitioners make decisions by understanding trade-offs, anticipating coordination and resource needs, and designing context-specific pathways that maintain equilibrium between security and political inclusion.

Scenario 1: Political transformation first
Political transformation precedes substantial disarmament and demobilisation. Former armed actors are granted political recognition, often as part of an interim government or transitional authority, before full-scale DDR programme implementation begins. This model relies on political trust and inclusive power-sharing to create incentives for eventual disarmament.

Scenario 1: Nepal

The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) established a process in which disarmament and political transformation were deliberately intertwined. Rather than demanding immediate demobilisation, the CPA provided for Maoist combatants to be cantoned under United Nations supervision while the movement simultaneously entered mainstream politics. The CPN-M registered as a political party, participated in the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections, and eventually led the government. This sequencing allowed the movement to exchange military leverage for legitimate political influence without losing its bargaining power prematurely. However, the slow pace of security sector integration and delays in reintegration generated frustration among combatants and exposed the fragility of the equilibrium, contributing to later internal splits and factionalism within the CPN-M. Examples: Electoral and institutional reform

Other examples:
South Africa (1990–1994); Burundi (2003–2005); Juba Peace Agreement in Sudan (2020)

Advantages
- Builds confidence that political inclusion is genuine.
- Encourages early engagement in governance and constitution-making.

Risks
- Retaining armed capacity while exercising political power may undermine or endanger political processes, like e.g., election violence.
- Without effective monitoring, spoilers can exploit dual power.

Scenario 2: Security first or sequential DDR

Disarmament and demobilisation precede significant political participation. The focus is on restoring state control and public security before opening formal political space for former armed actors.

Advantages

- Reduces immediate risk of armed conflict relapse.
- Builds confidence in the state's monopoly of force before reforming political structures.

Risks

- Former combatants may feel politically marginalised or coerced into disarmament, or choose not to engage in formal politics
- Risk of relapse if political avenues do not open soon after.

Scenario 2: Liberia

Following the 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, two rebel movements and political parties, DDR was prioritised to stabilise the country and pave the way for democratic elections. The United Nations oversaw one of the largest DDR operations in Africa, collecting more than 100,000 weapons and demobilising around 103,000 combatants between 2003 and 2009. This early focus on security helped restore state authority and public confidence, allowing national elections to take place in 2005. However, political participation for former combatants was largely postponed until after demobilisation. Most ex-combatants were encouraged to return to civilian life rather than to organised political activity, and there were few formal mechanisms for collective representation of ex-fighters or their commanders. As a result, reintegration and reconciliation programmes later had to address feelings of exclusion and the risk of remobilisation, particularly among unemployed youth and former faction leaders seeking political relevance.

Other examples:

Sierra Leone (1999–2002); Angola (2002–2005); Côte d'Ivoire (2007–2010)

Scenario 3: Parallel or integrated sequencing

DDR and political transformation advance simultaneously and in close coordination. Progress in one track is linked to measurable steps in the other, often through joint monitoring and verification bodies.

Scenario 3: Northern Ireland

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement linked disarmament, demilitarisation, and political participation through a reciprocal, trust-building process. Armed groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) agreed to decommission their weapons under international supervision while their political wing, Sinn Féin, simultaneously joined the new power-sharing institutions. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) and joint monitoring bodies ensured that progress on security measures was matched by political inclusion and reform. Although decommissioning advanced gradually and was

only completed in 2005, the parallel sequencing of both tracks helped sustain confidence in the peace process and enabled former armed actors to become legitimate political stakeholders.

Other examples:

El Salvador (1992–1995); Guatemala (1996–1999); Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (2001–2010); Aceh, Indonesia (2005-2008); Colombia (2016 onwards)

Advantages

- Maintains a balanced sense of reciprocity.
- Encourages continuous political dialogue and mutual accountability.

Risks

- High coordination demand; delays in one track can stall the other.
- Requires robust verification and communication channels.

Scenario 4: Adaptive or iterative sequencing

DDR and political transformation evolve dynamically based on conditions on the ground. Rather than fixed sequencing, steps are adjusted as trust, capacity, and political will change. This approach recognises that peace processes rarely unfold linearly.

Scenario 4: Bangsamoro (Philippines)

The Bangsamoro peace process illustrates an adaptive approach in which DDR and political transformation evolved through successive, trust-based phases. Under the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, decommissioning of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) combatants was linked to political milestones such as the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (2018) and the gradual establishment of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority. Each phase of decommissioning and governance reform was adjusted to reflect progress, delays, and changing political realities, with oversight from joint bodies and international monitors. The first parliamentary elections of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), initially planned for 2022, were postponed to 2026 to allow further consolidation of institutions and normalisation efforts. This iterative design maintained momentum and built confidence, demonstrating how flexibility and continuous dialogue can sustain peace implementation in complex transitions.

Other examples:

Yemen (2011–present); South Sudan (2015–2023)

Advantages

- Allows context-driven flexibility and responsiveness.
- Requires keeping communication and negotiation channels between the parties alive.
- Enables mid-course corrections as realities shift.

Risks

- May appear unpredictable or inconsistent if not well-communicated.
- Requires sustained mediation and monitoring to manage expectations.

Figure 1: Scenarios for Sequencing DDR and Political Transformation



HOW?

Support options for political transformation during D – D – R

The three core DDR phases – disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration – each offer distinct entry points for political transformation support, and the way they are ordered and linked can fundamentally shape the success or fragility of the transition.

During **disarmament**, sequencing choices revolve around the trade-off between confidence-building and political assurance. If weapons are put beyond use too early, before credible political guarantees are in place, ex-combatants may feel stripped of bargaining power; if too late, the state's monopoly of force remains contested. Some processes therefore link disarmament milestones to tangible political steps, such as recognition of a former armed movement as a political actor, lifting of sanctions, appointment to transitional institutions, or interim power-sharing arrangements. This helps synchronise the reduction of coercive power with the gradual expansion of political agency.

In the **demobilisation phase**, sequencing typically focuses on leadership transformation and organisational adaptation. As command structures dissolve, former military leaders often assume new roles as political or civic representatives. Support at this stage can include training for political dialogue, public communication, or electoral participation, helping to channel group cohesion towards a civic support structure rather than remobilisation. Ensuring that demobilisation is coupled with visible political openings such as access to transitional assemblies or electoral preparation signals to combatants that their transition is meaningful and not merely symbolic.

Finally, **reintegration** provides the most sustained window for deepening political transformation. As former combatants return to communities, DDR support can be accompanied by governance and civic participation initiatives that link individual reintegration to collective political

inclusion. This may involve civic education, local dialogue forums, or support for ex-combatants' associations that promote democratic participation. Sequencing here should ensure that reintegration is not only economic but also political, creating pathways from local legitimacy to national representation, particularly for women and youth formerly associated with armed groups, as these often face structural barriers to these fora.

Throughout all three phases, practitioners must continuously calibrate timing: the pace of disarmament should align with the emergence of credible political institutions; demobilisation should reinforce rather than fragment the movement's political coherence; and reintegration should consolidate, not dilute, participation. Successful sequencing is therefore less about fixed order and more about **maintaining equilibrium** by ensuring that reduction in armed power is matched by a corresponding expansion of political space.

The equilibrium is at the same time essential for maintaining and deepening trust between the former adversaries, contributing also to openness to advancing on other elements of a peace agreement and post-conflict processes. Political guarantees by external third-party guarantors can play important roles in overcoming a trust vacuum in the first place and can be referred to continuously throughout the implementation cycle.

WHO?
Stakeholders and coordination options

Effective sequencing of DDR and political transformation requires the coordinated engagement of a diverse set of actors operating at multiple levels of the peace process. Stakeholder ownership is essential, both by **state actors** such as transitional authorities, relevant ministries, DDR commissions and electoral commissions, and by their central counterparts in this process, namely the **leadership of (former) armed groups**. These actors should jointly define the parameters and sequencing of DDR and political participation. Peace process structures, including formal peace tables but also joint monitoring bodies and other platforms supporting continued dialogue during the implementation of peace agreements, provide critical coordination spaces to build and maintain trust between the parties and to align security and political tracks.

At the local level, **civil society**, community representatives, and women's and youth networks help anchor the transformation within society and ensure inclusive participation beyond the elite level. CSOs and local peace committees can feed information upwards, monitor reintegration impacts, and help manage perceptions of fairness and inclusion.

International support actors can facilitate trust-building and provide technical expertise, and guarantees, while ensuring coherence with broader governance and peacebuilding frameworks. In practice, DDR and political transformation are often supported by distinct but overlapping sets of institutions and actors.

- National bodies responsible for DDR typically receive technical support from experts within international missions (e.g. UN peace operation missions, EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions), specialised UN agencies/units such as UN Department of Peace Operations DDR Section, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), national agencies such as the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy, and specialised INGOs.

- Political transformation processes, by contrast, are usually overseen by national governments, transitional governance bodies, and electoral commissions, with support from international missions (e.g. Political Affairs departments) and dedicated agencies such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Foreign diplomats, political foundations and INGOs also play a role by providing training, dialogue spaces, and civic education.

For both processes, international mediators and guarantors can play a bridging role, ensuring that DDR programming and political reforms remain consistent with the spirit of the political settlement, and that communication between the parties is facilitated throughout implementation.

Between these two tracks, structured **coordination mechanisms** are essential to

maintain coherence and trust. Joint DDR-political transformation task forces or implementation steering committees can serve as central hubs, bringing together representatives from DDR commissions, political affairs ministries, former armed movements, and international partners. These bodies should meet regularly to align timelines, agree on linked milestones (for instance, disarmament benchmarks tied to political inclusion steps), and manage sensitive information in a transparent way. Where peace agreements establish joint monitoring or verification commissions, these can be expanded to include both DDR and political portfolios, ensuring that progress in one track reinforces the other. At the technical level, liaison officers or focal points embedded in each institution can facilitate daily communication, while shared information systems help track parallel developments.

Clearly defining roles, responsibilities, and communication channels among these actors prevents duplication, reduces mistrust, and supports a sequencing process that is both technically sound and politically legitimate. When these coordination layers are linked vertically, from local reintegration to national governance reform, they create the connective tissue that turns DDR and political transformation from parallel tracks into a single, coherent peacebuilding process.

Example: Coordinating DDR and political transformation in Colombia

In Colombia, the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) established one of the most comprehensive frameworks for linking DDR and political transformation. Implementation was guided by a set of joint structures that ensured constant coordination between the security and political dimensions of the transition. The National Reincorporation Council (CNR), composed equally of government and FARC representatives and supported by the UN Mission, oversaw all aspects of the DDR process, from the registration of ex-combatants to community reintegration projects. Parallel to this, the Commission for the Implementation, Monitoring, Verification and Dispute Resolution (CSIVI), including both parties and international guarantors, coordinated the broader political and institutional reforms promised in the peace accord.

Through these mechanisms, disarmament and reintegration milestones were directly linked to political commitments such as the registration of the FARC's new political party (Comunes), the allocation of guaranteed congressional seats, and security guarantees for political participation. Regular joint meetings, transparent information-sharing, and shared monitoring tools helped manage mistrust and synchronise progress across tracks. While challenges persisted, particularly regarding reintegration financing and local security, Colombia's experience shows how institutionalised coordination mechanisms can balance security transition with political inclusion, turning former armed actors into legitimate political stakeholders without destabilising the broader peace process.

Principles for effective sequencing: Practitioner checklist

Understand the drivers: Map the root causes that lead individuals to join armed groups and the underlying political, social, and economic factors that sustain armed group mobilisation. Distinguish between individual motivations and collective grievances and analyse how these evolve throughout the peace process. Ensure that political transformation efforts are sequenced alongside measures that address these drivers – so that shifts away from armed struggle are reinforced by credible pathways, including political pathways, that reduce incentives for remobilisation.

Understand the equilibrium: Identify how the balance between coercive power (arms) and participatory power (politics) can shift during the peace process. Ensure that reductions in military capacity are matched by credible increases in political opportunity. Establish joint analysis and information-sharing channels between mediators, negotiation support actors, DDR specialists, and governance experts involved in peace negotiations and implementation.



Map political and security linkages early: Analyse how DDR sequencing interacts with political, security, and institutional reforms (e.g., SSR, transitional justice, elections, power-sharing). Develop a joint sequencing roadmap with all relevant stakeholders before DDR design is finalised. Ask: Have political transformation objectives been defined and agreed by the parties? Are incentives aligned for both ex-combatants and political elites? Are DDR and political processes coordinated under one roadmap?

Apply a political economy lens: Recognise that sequencing decisions are shaped by power, resources, and incentives – not only by technical or security logic. Map who holds influence and what motivates them, including government actors, former armed groups, and donors. Understanding these dynamics helps anticipate resistance, align incentives, and prevent sequencing choices from being driven by short-term political or funding pressures. Where possible, link milestones to balanced benefits for all parties and ensure transparency in resource allocation to sustain trust.

Think ahead to implementation during peace negotiations: Prospects for realistic implementation are often not sufficiently considered at the negotiation table, while resource constraints frequently undermine peace implementation. Effective sequencing of DDR and political transformation requires that adequate financial and human resources be identified and pledged already during peace negotiations.



Design for adaptive sequencing, not fixed order: Recognise that timing will evolve as trust and conditions change. While it is important to seize momentum, it is equally essential to build flexibility into programme plans to respond to shifting dynamics. Linking DDR milestones to parallel political benchmarks (e.g., weapons collection tied to interim governance inclusion) can be useful, but communication channels between the parties must be able to address blockages and prevent implementation from stalling.



Promote national ownership and coordination: Align DDR and political transformation under shared national leadership, with clear roles across ministries and commissions. Establish coordination between DDR, SSR, and political structures at national and subnational levels, and define a clear, achievable role for DDR commissions in supporting political transformation.

Ensure inclusivity and representation: Guarantee that women, youth, and marginalised groups within armed movements and communities are part of political transformation processes. Avoid sequencing approaches that unintentionally privilege elite or military voices over civilian ones.



Integrate political transformation across all DDR phases:

- During disarmament: tie compliance to visible political commitments.
- During demobilisation: support leadership transition, organisational transformation, capacity-building, and civic education.
- During reintegration: promote inclusive governance, local participation, and civic engagement.
- Where no DDR programme exists, political transformation can still serve as a DDR-related tool to support individual or collective shifts from armed to political engagement.



Coordinate with complementary peacebuilding pillars: Link DDR and political transformation with transitional governance, stabilisation, SSR, elections, justice, and reconciliation efforts. Use existing peace agreement monitoring structures for cross-sector coordination and dispute resolution.

Strengthen communication and trust-building: Share clear, consistent information with ex-combatants, communities, and political stakeholders about sequencing milestones. Use dialogue platforms and joint monitoring bodies to sustain mutual confidence.



Be context-specific and learning-oriented: Tailor sequencing models to conflict history, power dynamics, and local political culture, avoiding one-size-fits-all templates. Capture lessons learned and good practices through continuous monitoring and adaptive learning.

References and further reading

Cho, J., Curtis, D.E.A., Dudouet, V., Malm, J., Sindre, G., & Söderberg Kovacs, M. (2022). *The Political Dynamics of DDR: Key Research Findings*. Folke Bernadotte Academy / Politics After War Network / UN DPO DDR Section.

Berghof Foundation (2019). *Managing Political Transformation and Security Transition Processes: A Strategic Framework.*

De Vries, H., & Wiegink, N. (2011). *Breaking up and going home? Contesting two assumptions in the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants*. International Peacekeeping.

Dudouet, V. (2009). *From war to politics: Resistance/liberation movements in transition*. Berghof Foundation.

Hülzer, J-M., Dudouet, V., Sidorowicz, S. & Kontogeorgos, T. (2022). *Leaving conflict firmly behind through the political transformation of armed groups: Notes for DDR and peacebuilding practitioners*. Berghof Foundation / UN DPO DDR Section.

Knight, Mark (2009). *Expanding the DDR Model: Politics and Organisations*. Journal of Security Sector Management

United Nations Department of Peace Operations (2020). *Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)* Module 2.20: The Politics of DDR.

This publication is part of a series of Primers offering brief insights and practical guidance on the political transformation of non-state armed groups as a core element of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and as a contribution to sustainable peace. These Primers are produced in the context of a project that aims to operationalise Module 2.20 of the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS): "The Politics of DDR" (https://www.unddr.org/). It is based on the collaboration between the United Nations Department of Peace Operations DDR Section (UNDPO DDR) and the Berghof Foundation. Through first-hand experience and on-site support, the project generates and disseminates concrete guidance on planning, designing and implementing politically sensitive DDR processes. It further develops training resources for DDR practitioners and other stakeholders involved in peace processes and post-war peacebuilding, with a focus on practical support for political transformation.

Berghof Foundation
Operations gGmbH
Lindenstraße 34
10969 Berlin
Germany

www.berghof-foundation.org
info@berghof-foundation.org

@berghoffnd.bsky.social
@BerghofFnd
/BerghofFoundation
/berghof-foundation
@berghoffnd

Department of Peace Operation (DPO)
Office of the Rule of Law & Security Institutions (OROLSI)
Disarmament Demobilization & Reintegration Section (DDRS)
2 United Nations Plaza. DC02 – 13th Floor
10017 New York, USA

www.unddr.org

@orolsi.bsky.social
@UN_OROLSI
/OROLSI
/orolsi
@un_orolsi